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NOTE AND COMMENT
GRANToR's REMEDY ON BREACH OF CONDITION SUBSFQUENT.-In Mash v.
Bloom (I9O7), - Wis. -, 114 N. W. Rep. 457, the court holds (SiBZcmm
and TIMLIN, JJ., dissenting) that one, having conveyed real property subject
to a condition subsequent, has n6 right of action to recover possession on
breach of the condition until he has taken "advantage of condition broken
and so notified the defendant, either by demand of possession or some other
act equivalent to a re-entry for condition broken."
The plaintiff had made a deed of conveyance of the premises in question
in consideration of $i.oo, natural love and affection, and upon the "special
considerations and conditions" that defendant and his wife should care for
the plaintiff and administer to her natural wants "as good, loving, affectionate
and kind children would do for a parent." The plaintiff had previously
sought by a suit in equity to enforce her rights under the deed, and had
asked to have it cancelled as a cloud on her title, but the court had held that
she had a complete and adequate remedy at law and might enforce her rights
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inejectment without resorting to equity: M'ash v. Bloom, Ino N. W. Rep.
203, 268. The parties had appeared before the court on the same matter
several times (see io5 N. W. Rep. 831; 114 N. W. Rep. 99), so that the
defendant had had notice of the nature of the plaintiff's demands. A statute
of the state provides (St. Wis. 1898, § 3o79) that it shall not be necessary for
a plaintiff in ejectment "to prove an actual entry under title nor the actual
receipt of any profits of the premises demanded, but it shall be sufficient for
him to show a right to the possession of such premises at the time of the
commencement of the action as heir, devisee, purchaser or otherwise." There-
fore, the circumstances of the case seem to have been such as to warrant the
court in disregarding the ancient rule which required a re-entry by the grantor
upon breach of a condition before bringing an action to recover possession.
It was certainly true once that no estate of freehold could be made to
cease, without entry, upon the breach of a condition: an estate of freehold
could not begin nor end without ceremony (Co. Litt. 214b.); and recent
decisions, other than those cited by the majority of the court in the principal
case, may be found sustaining the proposition that there must be a re-entry
by the plaintiff, or at least a demand of possession and 'refusal by the defend-
ant if peaceable re-entry cannot be made. (See, for example, Randall v' Went-
worth (19o5), oo Me. 177, 6o AUt. 871; Moss v. Chapptll, 126 Ga. 196, 54 S. E.
968; Preston v. Bosworth, 153 Ind. 458, 55 N. E. 224, 74 Am. St. Rep. 313.)
On the other hand, either because of 'statutes not unlike that of Wisconsin,
or because of the implied or express confession of lease, entry and ouster in
the action of ejectment, it is held in other recent ddcisions that an actual
entry for condition broken is no longer necessary, but that ejectment will lie,
without demand of possession or notice. Under the Washington statute, for
-instance (Ball. Co. § 55oo), providing that one having a valid interest in real
property and a right to possession may maintain ejectment, it is held that
neither entry nor demand of possession prior to the commencement of an
action to recover property for breach of condition is essential. Lewiston
Water & Power Co. v. Brown, 42 Wash. 555, 85 Pac. Rep. 47. And it was
expressly held in Trustees of Union College v. City of New York (1903),
173 N. Y. 38, 65 N. E. 853, 93 Am. St. Rep. 569, that proof of demand of
possession before commencing the action of ejectment on breach of condition
was unnecessary, and in Gray v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., i8g IIl. 400, the
plaintiff was apparently permitted to sue at once upon breach of the condition.
The prevailing doctrine seems to be that the "commencement of the action
stands in lieu of entry and demand of possession." Cowell v. Springs Co.,
o U. S. 55; Sioux City and St. P. R. Co. v. Singer, 49 Minn. 301, 51 N. 
W.
905, i5 L. R. A. 751, 32 Am. St. Rep. 554; Ritchie v. Kan. N. & D. R. Co., 55
Kan. 36; Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish, 21 Pick. 215; Brown v. Bennett,
75 Pa. St. 42o.
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